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International Court of Justice: Experiences and
Prospects
Louis B. Sohn*
The International Court of Justice ("ICJ" or "Court") is the
successor to both the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the Per-
manent Court of International Justice. Before the first court was
established in 1899, only ad hoc tribunals existed. This was due to
a basic fact of international law that international tribunals possessed
jurisdiction only if the parties to the case conferred it on the tribunal
either for that case or previously by an international agreement.
Therefore, the great problem of international law today is how to
confer as much jurisdiction on the international court as possible.
Now that the use of force is generally prohibited, the only way one
can solve a dispute is by a decision of some impartial international
body. Despite the doubts of some people, the International Court of
Justice is the closest thing we have to such an impartial international
body.
Jurisdiction conferred on the ICJ ordinarily is via a bilateral agree-
ment. Most of the cases before 1900 were submitted on this basis.
Only around 1890 did nations begin to include an arbitration clause
in agreements relating to other subjects such as treaties of commerce.
In 1881, Italy's Foreign Minister, Mr. Mancini, began this trend.
When concluding treaties with other nations, he would insert a clause
calling for any dispute under the agreement to be submitted by the
parties to arbitration. He succeeded in concluding 20 such agreements.
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Over the years, this form of agreement became one of the most
important bases for jurisdiction. In fact, the latest case between the
United States and Iran has been submitted to the ICJ on the basis
of two such agreements. So we have three types of bilateral agreements
which confer jurisdiction: bilateral agreements ad hoc, bilateral agree-
ments containing an interpretation clause, and bilateral agreements
to submit disputes between two states to various means of settlement:
conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement.
One of my first jobs at the United Nations, around 1950, was to
collect all agreements of the third type concluded between 1928 and
1948. I discovered that there were several hundred of them. Depending
on the type of dispute involved, conflicts were usually submitted for
settlement to the ICJ for legal disputes; to arbitration for legal or
non-legal disputes; and to conciliation for non-legal disputes.
The United States did not participate in this movement. It failed
to sign bilateral agreements conferring jurisdiction on the Court, nor
did it sign treaties containing "interpretation clauses." Whenever the
United States did sign an agreement, the Senate always appended a
reservation stating that "any case under this agreement may be sub-
mitted to the Court only with the special consent of the Senate."
After the ICJ was established in 1945, the same jurisdictional
problems arose. In a stroke of genius, it was decided that the Court
shall inherit all the jurisdiction held by the old PCIJ. Approximately
thirty declarations accepting the jurisdiction of the Court continued
to be binding, but most of them were subject to serious reservations,
and they could be invoked only by a state accepting the same ob-
ligation. In addition, jurisdiction under more than a hundred bilateral
dispute settlement treaties, and several hundred special treaties that
contained interpretational clauses, was transferred to the ICJ.
The question then arose, what would happen next? Senator Morse
of Oregon presented a resolution calling for the United States to
accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ. This was a revolutionary step. A
big debate then ensued in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.
The Committee, after some hesitation, approved the resolution. How-
ever, reservations were added at the last minute on the floor of the
Senate.
One stated that the United States could decide in each case whether
the case related to the domestic jurisdiction of the United States and,
therefore, should not be submitted to the ICJ. Fascinating examples
of domestic matters were given by the reservation's proponents. These
included immigration, traffic in women and children, and disputes
concerning the Panama Canal. It was a broad formula that covered
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everything. This first reservation was suggested by John Foster Dulles
to Senator Connally, and it became the Connally Amendment.
A second reservation, by Senator Vandenberg, provided for ex-
empting from the Court any jurisdiction concerning disputes under
multilateral treaties unless all parties to the dispute were before the
Court, an almost impossible condition. As a result, it was quite
difficult for the United States to sue anybody because the other
nation could immediately hide behind the reciprocal character of
those reservations and say, "sorry, we consider this a domestic case."
A good example of this was when an Israeli airliner was shot down
over Bulgaria. Bulgaria had accepted, supposedly, the jurisdiction of
the ICJ, but the Court later found that this declaration was no longer
valid. In the meantime, when the United States, United Kingdom
and Israel brought cases against Bulgaria before the Court, Bulgaria
immediately said shooting of an airplane over its own territory was
a matter of domestic jurisdiction. The Legal Adviser to the United
States Department of State, Mr. Hager, replied that this was nonsense.
He was immediately called to appear before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations and told: "But don't you know, this is at the
complete discretion of the United States and the other parties." Mr.
Hager then had to write a second letter to the ICJ apologizing for
his mistake. From that point on, everyone said that the American
clarification meant that the United States declaration stood for noth-
ing.
Nevertheless, since 1945, the United States has accepted jurisdiction
of the Court through various bilateral and multilateral treaties. To
date, about 70 such treaties have been accepted by the United States.
In several of the cases before the Court in which the United States
participated, jurisdiction was based on this kind of special treaty.
The case involving United States diplomats in Iran was one of them.,
As you know, we won. We have also submitted other cases by way
of bilateral agreements, one with Canada 2 and one with Italy.3
In a recent meeting between the Soviet Union and the United
States, the two countries agreed to search for a case they could submit
to the Court. For the moment, the Legal Advisers of the two gov-
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran Case (U.S. v. Iran),
1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24, 1980).
2 Concerning the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine
Area (Can. v. U.S.), 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12, 1984).
Concerning Elettronica Sicula (ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20,
1989).
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ernments have not been able to find such a case. Someone suggested
the Czarist bond case might be submitted. There exist some old bonds
issued by the Czar of Russia and other authorities prior to 1917. Of
course, the Soviet Union refused to pay for them as they were someone
else's bonds. Most people have thrown away these bonds, but there
have been some speculators buying them for pennies just in case
something can be collected. Now they are pressing the State De-
partment to pursue their claims. There is legislation which prevents
the United States from giving loans to, or making special arrangements
with, countries unless they have paid their debts. As a result, the
Soviet Union recently has come to the United States and said, "how
about doing something about the Czarist bonds?"
At the same time, there has been some disenchantment with the
Court. By 1989, only 50 nations have accepted the jurisdiction of
the Court by declarations under the optional clause. Most states have
accepted some compulsory jurisdiction of the Court by bilateral trea-
ties, multilateral treaties and by interpretation clauses in various
treaties. Once jurisdiction has been accepted, it is obligatory and
compulsory. One cannot wiggle out of it because consent has been
given. This is a crucial point. However, for some reason, international
lawyers have always emphasized the particular kind of declarations
of compulsory jurisdiction under Article 36 of the United Nations
Charter. Namely, that a state should accept the jurisdiction of the
Court reciprocally with respect to other nations accepting the same
jurisdiction. Even if the other state accepted a very broad jurisdiction,
it is entitled to invoke against the United States the narrow acceptance
of the United States and vice versa.
A case between France and Norway held to that effect.4 Norway
had a very generous declaration accepting the jurisdiction of the
Court very broadly. France had a number of reservations to its
declaration. France brought a case against Norway. Norway said
"Sorry, under your reservations, you cannot bring that case." The
ICJ agreed, stating Norway was entitled to invoke France's reser-
vations.
In the 1970's and 1980's, cases began arising in which states refused
to even go to the Court when they were brought under one of the
compulsory jurisdictional clauses. Examples include France5 and the
4 Certain Norwegian Loans Case (Fr. v. Nor.), 1957 I.C.J. 9 (July 6, 1957).
Nuclear Tests Cases (Austl. v. Fr., N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253, 457 (Dec.
20, 1974).
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United States .6 Usually, the refusing state followed the Court's de-
cision holding that it had jurisdiction, by denouncing the jurisdiction
of the Court. The United States did exactly that, and in April of
1987 the U.S.' 1946 declaration expired. However, the United States
still is bound by approximately 70 treaties that accept the Court's
jurisdiction.
Over the past few years, the American Bar Association has discussed
the issue whether it can do something about the problem. It concluded
that at this time, the only thing that could work would be to accept
the jurisdiction of the Court in a different way. Instead of accepting
jurisdiction under a very broad clause with reservations, we should
accept jurisdiction by "opting-in." Namely, we might be willing to
accept jurisdiction with respect to certain specified subjects.
It was suggested by Mr. Gorbachev a few years ago that the Soviet
Union would be willing to accept, with respect to other members of
the Security Council, the jurisdiction of the Court over certain sub-
jects. The United States took this opportunity to discuss the matter
further with the Soviet Union and agreed to locate some treaties as
to which both nations would be willing to accept the compulsory
jurisdiction of the ICJ with respect to their interpretation and ap-
plication. They found a few such treaties; one of them related to
terrorist activities. The two Legal Advisers drafted an agreement
accepting jurisdiction under seven treaties; it is expected that the two
Foreign Ministers will initial it and send it to their governments for
ratification. 7
However, a suggestion was then made that there should be one
condition attached to this agreement. Namely, that this treaty would
come into effect only if accepted by the other three permanent
members of the Security Council: the United Kingdom, France and
China. However, China has not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction
of the ICJ in any of its treaties. If a treaty contained a clause
concerning jurisdiction, China always made a reservation to it. Na-
tionalist China accepted, in some cases, binding jurisdiction. However,
when People's Republic of China decided to accept some of these
treaties, it did it with a reservation as to the jurisdiction of the ICJ.
That is the present situation. The Section of International Law of
the American Bar Association made three proposals at its last Annual
Meeting which were accepted by the House of Delegates of the
6 Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Merits) (June 27, 1986).
7 N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1989, at AS, col. 1.
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Association. First, that the U.S. should accept jurisdiction of the
Court by a bilateral treaty with the Soviet Union. Second, if it is
good for the Soviet Union, it might also be good for some allies of
the United States (e.g. members of NATO and the OECD). These
countries might decide that there are some subjects or series of treaties
with respect to which they might be willing to accept the jurisdiction
of the ICJ. It is difficult to imagine, but nevertheless true, that we
have no general peaceful settlement treaty with the United Kingdom,
France or Canada accepting the jurisdiction of the Court. We have
some agreements with these nations where we accept jurisdiction for
a particular problem and a few agreements that contain special in-
terpretation clauses, but we are not a party to an agreement with a
general clause conferring jurisdiction. So perhaps, if we can't have
a general clause with our allies, maybe we can have a little broader
clause with them than the one we will have with the Soviet Union.
Third, if we can succeed with the second proposal, maybe we can
find other groups of states with which we might be able to do the
same. An example would be Latin America. In all three cases, we
might be able to conclude an agreement in which we would be willing
to accept the Court's jurisdiction without the Senate's special consent
in each case.
Today, there are approximately 40 nations which have accepted
jurisdiction of the ICJ. Interestingly, in the last 15 years, the Western
European countries and the United States have been withdrawing
their acceptance of jurisdiction. On the other hand, the countries of
Africa, Asia and the Caribbean have been accepting the jurisdiction
of the Court. Ironically a country which we have often accused of
being the great violator of international law, Libya, has accepted the
jurisdiction of the Court in two cases, both by special agreement. It
may possibly bring a third case before the Court very soon. While
the United States is supposed to be the great protector of law and
order in the world, we seem to have trouble in deciding whether to
accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ. We claim the Court may be biased.
You have probably heard the famous statement by one of our Senators
who said, "How can you trust an international court if there is only
one American and fourteen foreigners?"
Although there is strong feeling in our country that the decision
in the Nicaragua case was a wrong one, I agree only partially. I am
probably considered to be biased, as I assisted the United States
concerning one important aspect of the case. But I really believe that
the Court did not have jurisdiction over the case in the first place.
Once the Court decided it had jurisdiction, however, I considered
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that we should defend our case on the merits, and that if we should
do it, we might have a good chance to win on the merits. But we
did not defend ourselves. On the basis of a unilateral presentation
by Nicaragua, the Court decided both that the United States violated
various rules of international law and that some compensation was
due. What was interesting about the second part of the case was
that, on the one hand, in a number of paragraphs the Court held
that the United States has violated international law, but there were
also quite a few paragraphs stating that the United States did not
violate international law and that Nicaragua's allegations were not
justified. This the Court did even though the holding has to be based
on a unilateral presentation of the facts. In the third part of the
case, determining the amount of compensation, we again are staying
away from the Court. If we were there, perhaps the compensation
would be smaller; otherwise, it may remain in the millions.
As it often does, the Court was able to use this occasion to clarify
some important rules of international law, such as those relating to
the use of force and to intervention. Therefore, for the future, it is
not important what the Court decided about the United States, but
that the Court decided some basic issues of international law; and
clarified the restrictions on the use of force in situations involving
internal strife. These restrictions can be now utilized against Cuba,
Nicaragua and others.
Dean Rusk**
I'm very honored to be with my two distinguished colleagues for
this discussion today. My comments will be relatively short, but I
would start with the proposition that compliance with international
law and our treaties is a fundamental policy objective of the United
States. There have been some exceptions. We have more than 7000
treaties and agreements with other nations. We send out on every
working day about 3000 cables from the State Department to our
posts and to governments throughout the world. I once did some
spot checks on these and discovered that about 25% of those cables
dealt with the administration of treaties and with problems of in-
ternational law. A junior officer on the third floor of the State
Department does not have to go running up to the seventh floor to
ask the Secretary of State whether we should comply with our treaties.
** Former Secretary of State (1961-1969), Samuel H. Sibley Professor of Inter-
national Law, School of Law, University of Georgia, Athens, Georgia.
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He can take it for granted that it is our stated intention to do so.
Now, we don't always do so, but I point out, that in the main, only
the President and the Congress can violate treaties or international
law. No President will want anyone junior to him to bring upon
himself and the United States a charge of violating international law.
So you will find in those instances where we clearly did violate
international law that those were decisions made by the President or
Congress.
Now as far as the Congress is concerned, you must be aware that
treaties and statutes are on a par with each other. Therefore, Congress
can easily pass a statute which is valid as a matter of domestic law
but which puts us in a position of violating international law. That
sometimes occurs and is embarrassing. When we were working on
the creation of the United Nations in 1945, some of us were very
anxious to give full scope to the International Court of Justice. We
wanted to accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court without
reservation. But as Professor Sohn has pointed out, that ran into a
snag in the Senate. We finally approved the treaty, but it included
the Connally Reservation. By reserving to ourselves the right to decide
whether we would accept the jurisdiction of the Court, rather than
leaving the question of jurisdiction to the Court, we surrendered our
right as Plaintiffs before the Court. This is because that form of
compulsory jurisdiction operates reciprocally.
I once was speaking with Paul Martin, the Canadian Foreign
Minister, about some of our disputes concerning the waters of the
far north. At one point I said "We'll take you before the ICJ." He
said, "Oh no you won't because we will simply cite the Connally
Reservation and you are dead." Unfortunately, he was quite right.
We voluntarily surrendered our right to use compulsory jurisdiction
to bring anyone before the Court because we did not completely
accept the Court's jurisdiction ourselves.
Those of us who were interested in strengthening international law
and the institutions which supported it were disappointed in 1945
with the Connally Reservation. I'm not sure in broad prospectus
whether we were particularly evil in that situation because relatively
few countries had accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
without reservation. As Professor Sohn pointed out, for practical
purposes, the way to get into the ICJ is by the agreement of the
parties. Despite the Connally Reservation, we have accepted approx-
imately 70 treaties which say that if a dispute arises under that treaty,
then disputes will be settled by the ICJ. That is one way to get
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around the Connally Reservation to a degree, and I think those
clauses are quite important and useful.
There still is a great deal of unfinished business for international
law. The law of war and the use of force are in good shape. But
the governments of the world have not been willing or able to apply
these laws to the point of preventing wars. I am relatively encouraged
by the progress which seems to have been made in recent years on
this subject. There is still a lot of unfinished business in fields which
require organization and cooperation. One such field is with regard
to the environment, where law is waiting to be created. I think we'll
get to it, but I don't know.
I've had some problems with Star Wars in that we've heard nothing
about the basic treaty on outer space that we adopted in 1967.11 Within
ten years of the launching of Sputnik, and ten years is a short time
as these matters go, under the auspices of the United Nations there
evolved a major treaty on outer space. This was based on a unanimous
resolution of the General Assembly just a few years before. Under
that treaty outer space was to be a sphere of scientific exploration
and peaceful cooperation. Astronauts and cosmonauts were consid-
ered to be the envoys of all mankind. The Moon and other celestial
bodies were not subject to national appropriation. In other words,
the human race was able to dream a little and to set aside a special
regime for outer space which would seem to leave no room for actual
stationing of weapons in outer space. I myself would greatly regret
the actual placing of weapons in outer space, although certain passive
activities in space which have military use are acceptable-for ex-
ample, the use of outer space for communications and satellite pho-
tography. We and the Soviets have agreed that satellite photography
is a useful national means of detection for monitoring disarmament
treaties.
We have a considerable way to go in making use of an international
court. One has to accept the proposition that some of the judges on
the ICJ vote the policies of their own governments and probably are
under instruction. On the other hand, some of the judges refrain
from doing so, and it is my belief that if the United States Government
tried to instruct the American judge on the ICJ, that judge could
resign and blow the State Department or the Secretary of State out
9 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S.
205.
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of the water for impropriety. I suspect the same thing is true for
the judge from the United Kingdom and some other nations. Nev-
ertheless, one must still bear in mind that there are some members
of the Court who probably act on a political basis.
When two governments have reached the point where they are
willing to submit a case to the ICJ, they usually are in a mood to
settle the case by negotiation. This is because it is usually quicker,
easier, simpler and leaves room for each party to get something out
of the result. You do not, therefore, expect to find a large docket
for the ICJ.
We ourselves have been occasionally negligent about international
law, despite the general policy that we support treaties and inter-
national law. When you think of those situations where we seem to
be in violation, it is most certainly the President or Congress or both
who are involved. When we made the terrible mistake of the Bay of
Pigs, President Kennedy dismissed problems of international law
which I, myself, raised on the grounds that was the way Castro came
to power. He felt that a successful coup d'etat of the sort Castro
had achieved was self-legitimizing in that if it succeeded, it would
gradually receive the recognition of other nations of the world. In-
ternational law played a major role in the Cuban missile crisis. See
Abe Chayes' short book on the role of international law in that
crisis.
I think we were very shortsighted in the way the Reagan Admin-
istration handled the Law of the Sea Treaty. After seven years of
hard negotiations, some of it brilliant negotiations, we decided that
we would have no part of it. However, we now claim that those
parts of the treaty we like are part of customary international law.
I think that was rather badly handled.
The mining of the harbors of Nicaragua hit me wrong. I thought
to mine those harbors without a general notification to international
shipping that we had placed mines there was at the very least a
violation of international law. By and large, the policy of the United
States has been in support of our treaty obligations and international
law; and I think we have played a generous role of which we need
not be ashamed.
Gabriel M. Wilner***
It is obviously a great honor for me to be sitting at the same table
with two great experts in this field. My contribution will be to discuss
*** Thomas M. Kirbo Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Georgia,
Athens, Georgia.
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the positive development with respect to the acceptance by states of
the opportunity to litigate before the International Court of Justice.
The use of chambers of the Court has opened options for states free
of some of the criticisms which the use of the full Court has raised.
One of the major criticisms of the Court levelled by some, and
referred to by Professor Rusk, is that countries are often apprehensive
of including in the full Court judges who are either unwilling or
unable to decide in an unbiased manner the issues presented in a
particular case. According to this view, many judges are obliged by
their own governments, or led by their own view of international
law, to act or to decide in a way which is incompatible with Western
views. However, the Statute of the International Court of Justice
and its Rules do allow the states involved in a dispute to agree to
request that the Court create a chamber to decide a controversy which
has arisen. Article 26 of the Court's Statute provides for the formation
of chambers composed of three or more judges; chambers have
generally been composed of five judges.
The chamber alternative has been used by the United States in at
least two cases, namely, the Gulf of Maine case9 and more recently,
the Elettronica Sicula (ELSI) case.'0 I believe that the United States'
participation in the 'Gulf of Maine case was contemporaneous with
its refusal to participate in the case involving the mining of Nicaraguan
harbors." On the one hand, the United States was quite unhappy
with the process of adjudication before the full Court, and it stead-
fastly refused to participate in the process even after the Court found
jurisdiction in the Nicaragua Case. On the other hand, the United
States did agree to the use of a chamber for the purpose of settling
the maritime boundary dispute with Canada. The use of a chamber
means that, essentially, the Court acts as a type of arbitral tribunal
where the interested states, in fact, select the judges who will hear
the case from among the members of the full Court.
The judges selected in the ELSI case were Judges Ruda (who took
over after the death of Judge Singh), Oda, Ago, Schwebel, and
Jennings. The case came before the Court on the basis of one of
the bilateral treaties Professor Sohn spoke of earlier. The 1948 Friend-
ship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN) Treaty between the United
States and Italy called for the submission to the ICJ of any dispute
9 1984 I.C.J. 246 (Oct. 12, 1984).
1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20, 1989).
Nicaragua Case, 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Merits) (June 27, 1986).
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between the parties as to the interpretation or application of the
treaty. The Italians maintained that there had been no breach of the
bilateral treaty while the United States insisted that the subsidiary of
the American company had been taken or "requisitioned", as the
local authorities in Italy termed it. In the view of the United States,
this action was tantamount to taking without compensation. The facts
revealed that bankruptcy had subsequently been declared, and the
property rights of the shareholders had disappeared. The chamber
of the Court in the ELSI case was composed of "respectable" Wes-
terners. No communists, socialists, nor judges from developing coun-
tries who might be hostile to the protection of the private property
of transnational corporations were involved. Nevertheless, the Cham-
ber found that the FCN treaty had not been breached and decided
in favor of Italy. The United States, even though it lost the case,
apparently had found the use of chambers an acceptable means for
the settlement of at least some international disputes.
Clearly, the method of using chambers is practical when parties
mutually wish to settle quickly and quietly a specific dispute; such
is generally the case when their relationship is a friendly one. This
was true in the Gulf of Maine case as well as the ELSI case. Moreover,
a chamber may be used when states are anxious to restore a friendly
relationship, but cannot do so on the political level until the dispute
is settled. The boundary dispute between Burkina Faso and Mali 12 is
an example of the latter type of circumstance.
However, it is also true that in other instances the developing
countries have used the full Court to settle disputes with each other.
The use of the full Court, which appears to be growing among
developing countires, is often based on specific agreements entered
into at the time of the dispute. A country which finds itself in a
dispute with another state is able to avoid unending political con-
frontation by using the Court. Thus, whatever the outcome, the
countries involved can tell their peoples that they adhered to inter-
national law and to its process of dispute settlement. This technique
can be helpful to states in dealing with the unpopularity of a particular
solution where such a solution, which would result from negotiations,
might bring about the collapse of one or both governments. The use
of chambers or of the full Court for purposes of resolving cases,
where an undesirable political impasse is the alternative and where
12 Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554 (Dec.
22, 1986).
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there is a good chance that the parties' will accept the Court's
judgment, is good news for those who would like the Court in the
Hague to be active.
Experts who have predicted the demise of the International Court
of Justice as an effective organ of the international community are
now astonished to see that it is increasing its caseload. In fact, it
appears today that some of the judges are complaining of the extensive
number of cases now before the Court. The use of chambers should
be helpful to aid the Court in dealing with its future caseload.
The increasing use of the Court by both developing and developed
countries is certainly a positive sign of the general attitude toward
international law in the international community. It is important,
however, to encourage the use of the ICJ and its chambers not only
among these groups of states but also between them. This general
trend could encourage the United States to be more forthcoming in
finding approaches which will enable it to agree to the Court's
jurisdiction.
Thomas J. Schoenbaum****
I have a two-part question for Professor Rusk. First, can you
confirm the story that Professor Sohn told us that the actual source
of the Connally Reservation was John Foster Dulles? Second, did
you have any discussion with Mr. Dulles about the Connally Res-
ervation?
Dean Rusk
I suspect that the Connally Reservation arose out of consultations,
behind the scenes, between John Foster Dulles and some of the
Senators. My firm impression was that whatever they said publicly
about the reasons for the Connally Reservation, the operating reason
was the view of a considerable number of Senators that they did not
want American racial questions to be brought before the Court. My
guess is, knowing John Foster Dulles pretty well, that if he came to
that conclusion, it was not on his own initiative, but that it came
out of private talks between him and Senators Connally, Vandenberg
and others.
Professor Wilner made a most important point about one of the
functions of the Court. Governments may get themselves in a situation
**** Rusk Professor of Law, School of Law, University of Georgia, Athens,
Georgia.
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where they would like to see a problem settled, but are not able to
take the political heat at home for giving into the other nation.
Therefore, the use of the ICJ acts as a political weapon to take the
heat off whichever government loses the case. I'm sure that is an
operating factor in the case of many governments, including ourselves
and Canada.
